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LOCATING AUTHORITY IN LAW,
AND AVOIDING THE AUTHORITARIANISM OF “TEXTUALISM”

Patrick McKinley Brennan1

I. Introduction: The Self-Knowledge that Is Necessary for Law and for Authority
What is the locus of authority in what we do in the name of law? This question, it should
be apparent, is both circumscribed and expansive. From the angle of circumscription, the
question postulates (1) “authority” (2) as an isolable element (3) in a practice in which (4) “we”
are engaged (5) “in the name of law.” The angle that highlights the “we” forebodes the
expansion. After all, in order to locate authority’s place in what we do in the name of law, we
must say who “we” are. What could be easier -- or less possible? “‘Know thyself’ we hear
suggested for our own good. Yet we hardly know ourselves.”2
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Our resistance to self-knowledge has no doubt many causes, but among the legally
orthodox, the asymptotic elimination of the human subject is virtually axiomatic. The orthodox
would vouchsafe law’s objectivity exactly by denying or minifying the subject’s appearance in
our legal undertakings. As one critic of the orthodoxy explains:
Sometimes it seems as if there is only one story in American legal thought and only one
problem. The story is the story of formalism and the problem is the problem of the
subject. The story of formalism is that it never deals with the problem of the subject.
The problem of the subject is that it’s never been part of the story.3
The heterodoxy I wish to develop and defend here takes the human subject as (proximate)
starting point -- the font of law and authority to live by.4
This competing theory observes that both the possibility and exigence of law -- and the
authority that alone makes law possible -- issue from our subjectivity. Force and violence reach
us from without, and they do so arbitrarily and with no regard for who we are. We become
lawful, however, from the inside out, if we choose to do so at all. This is because -- or, so I shall
argue -- we subjects are normatively oriented, though not determined, to the real and the good.
We humans are not mere objects, nor does the normative order arrest us from without in episodes
of ‘now for something totally different.’ But before we advert to or thematize the fact, the fact is
that we are ordered out of ourselves, first, to discover what is (the real) and, second, to discover
and then realize the valuable that might yet be (the good). Because this normativity is
indefeasibly ours (as long as our rational capacities shall last), all additional or subsequent
normative claims -- including those made ‘in the name of the law’ -- must meet its anterior and
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concomitant demands. Which is why we can say, with Joseph Vining: “The question what the
law ‘is’ is not so very different from the question who we ‘are.’”5
The jurisprudential mandarins who keep orthodoxy afloat are at pains to keep this a
secret. Ronald Dworkin’s signal defection from humanity to Hercules is only the limit case;
most mainstream legal theorists are content to prosecute the more modest quest for the rule of
law that is as much as possible not a rule of men. We are all legal realists now, of course; “no
adult needs to be told that we live under a rule of men in the sense that laws are made,
interpreted, and administered by real men and women.”6 However, at least from the moment the
eager first Realists spotted the camel in the vicinity of the tent of law, those concerned for law’s
rule have been trying to reconstruct law by constructing theories of how proto-realists can be
made lawful.7 Robert Bork’s originalism, Justice Scalia’s textualism, Bruce Ackerman’s
dualism, Owen Fiss’s disciplining rules, Ronald Dworkin’s integrity8 -- from the right and from
the left they come bearing theoretical gifts designed to ensure law’s rule in this world brought to
us by Charles Darwin and Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. This is the world in which the idea that
there is a norm that precedes what we do in the name of the law -- a norm to which we are
obligated freely to conform our living and the ‘positive law’ by which we structure and govern it
-- has to compete with the idea that the only ‘laws’ are those of physics.
Some students of law oppose the embarrassing surfeit of theoretical riches by denying
that the game is worth the candle; the aspiration to a rule of law, they say, is simply misplaced, a
holdover from pre-lapsarian naivete. Paul Kahn, for instance, in a very profound study of what
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we do in the name of the law, concludes that “the rule of law may be our deepest political myth”
and recommends -- citing the authority of Abraham Lincoln -- that in place of law, we appeal
first to charity.9 Others counter the grand theories with more modest, more prosaic, more
“pragmatic” aims and means. Judge Posner proposes legal pragmatism simpliciter, and Cass
Sunstein, to pick another example, advocates “incompletely theorized agreements.”10
This is all very interesting, to be sure -- but the trouble, as I see it, is that the ‘grand
theory vs. muddling through’ false dilemma has largely blocked the human subject from view,
and, along with him or her, the very possibility of authority and, therefore, of law. The result of
this theory-driven occlusion of the potentially-lawful subject is that what is put forward as law
cannot but look “largely irrelevant to the self,”11 no better than “an unintelligible restraint.”12
What we adults do “need to be told” – or, rather, what we need to discover for ourselves -- is
what it is in us that generates authority and thus makes law possible, thereby preempting or
displacing the authoritarian and the arbitrary. The availability of the authoritarian and of the
arbitrary we can take for granted, but the possibility of law and of authority needs to be made out
afresh, and this requires -- or, so I am arguing -- that we get to know ourselves.
What we do in the name of law has its externalia such as courthouses and capitols, codes
and codicils, robes and ritual action, and these import ‘authority’ of a sort. Furthermore, for
reasons to which we shall come, we cannot do without externalia in law and the ‘authority’
associated with them. But whereas no one mistakes robes and courthouses for the law itself,
some do mistake texts for the law itself, thereby dissolving the possibility of genuine authority
into one of its frequent fruits. Texts, like other artifacts of our creation, are not self-moving, self9
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justifying marionettes of law; texts do not rise of themselves to wield authority over us. A book
of black marks the cover of which is embossed “Revised Statutes of the State of Utopia” or
“Restatement (Seventh) of Everything” is an unlikely contributor to law; but if on the cover were
etched “California” instead of “Utopia” or “Contracts” instead of “Everything,” we might -- or
we might not -- have a different case, as anyone familiar with ‘unconstitutional’ statutes and the
‘persuasive authority’ of a Restatement knows. In figuring out what might make the difference
in the latter case, what I am after is what in us is the root of law and of authority -- in a phrase,
the inner experience of law.13
On the account I shall develop, ‘the inner experience of law’ includes the cognitional and
volitional experiences of the legislator promulgating texts, of the judge interpreting these texts,
and of the sheriff determining how to give coercive effect to judicial decisions bearing on the
community; it also includes the experience of individual subjects understanding those rules and
then receiving or rejecting them as guides to conduct. Underneath and uniting all these (and
other) particular inner experiences of law, however, there is the primordial inner experience of
law; anteceding all particular experiences of law, it is the condition of their possibility. I shall
refer to it as the experience of inner law, what I referred to above as our normative orientation
out of our interiority toward the real and the valuable. ‘Inner law’ is my name for what Bernard
Lonergan, S.J. (1904-1984), referred to as the criterion that precedes “the criteria of truth
invented by the philosophers:”14 it is “the dynamic criterion of the further question immanent in
intelligence itself.” Lonergan continues:
Name it what you please, alertness of mind, intellectual curiosity, the spirit of inquiry,
active intelligence, the drive to know. Under any name, it remains the same and is, I
13
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trust, very familiar to you. This primordial drive, then, is the pure question. It is prior to
any insights, any concepts, any words, for insights, concepts, words, have to do with
answers; and before we look for answers, we want them; such wanting is the pure
question.15
Our texts, our decisions, and our actions are, I shall argue, contributions to law exactly inasmuch
as they are governed by inner law;16 it is (exactly) individual and collective obedience to inner
law, I shall argue, that creates authority and law.
Although Lonergan was right to insist that, in general, what you name this primal
criterion is secondary to heeding its hegemony, the project at hand will hardly tolerate such
linguistic license. Positivists and others bent on a univocal definition of law will resist the usage
according to which what is within us is “law,” but this usage is virtually required when one
acknowledges that our rational consciousness, our subjectivity, is normatively ordered toward
the real and the good. Recognition of this primordial norm promulgated within our rational
consciousness leads to the acknowledgment of its preeminent status as law, with all subsequent
undertakings in the name of law somehow analogically and derivatively related to it. For us, law
begins within, and, if we heed it, proceeds outward through authority that allows the creation of
particular laws for humans to live by.
The project of tracing our communal lawfulness to authority and ultimately to inner law
will upset the sensibilities of souls bent on finding law that is so objective as to be (almost) able
to claim its own instances. But, getting to know ourselves, we just might discover that inner law
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provides the foundation, a rock from and on which we can build.17 Our compliance with it can
create authority, and authority can speak (positive) law to us as individuals and as community.
Inner law is not a rock after the manner of a “rail that runs surety through our judgments,”18 but it
does promise to lead us, if we would choose to follow, to the real and the good. The authority
that it makes possible is not forceful, but it is correlative to our dignity as free beings capable of
choosing intelligence over violence. A rock that is the human spirit working itself out may not
be what H.L.A. Hart’s absolute-absolutist had wanted, but it just may be what we need in order
to assure authority, instead of authoritarianism, in what we do in the name of law.19 “Is everyone
to use force against everyone to convince everyone that force is beside the point?”20

II. The Tempting of Scalia
To recognize inner law for what it means subordinating all else to it, and we should
recognize right away that this subordination thwarts another familiar and forceful aspiration, the
one Thomas Paine thought was satisfied in what the colonists were creating: “In America, the
law is king.”21 David Dudley Field was of the same mind: “The law is our only sovereign. We
have enthroned it.”22 The aspiration to which Paine and Field gave famous American expression
is to displace the modern personal sovereign -- conjured variously and menacingly by Thomas
Hobbes, Jean Bodin, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and John Austin, among others -- with a sovereign
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that just is human law. On the typically modern conception, the (personal) sovereign was to be
above the law, possessed of absolute and unconstrained power.23 On the view Paine and his
progeny propound, by contrast, positive law is as high as it gets. The substitution of sovereign
law for the unconstrained personal sovereign is modernity’s hope to do better than Hobbes.24
Hans Kelsen had something of the sort in mind, and, for its part, I am afraid, even the
Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church (published in English in Rome in 1994) refers
to “the principle of the ‘rule of law,’ in which the law is sovereign . . . .”25 Closer to home,
Justice Antonin Scalia, having made a profound genuflection to democracy, has been tireless in
his privileging of positive law: “It is the law that governs us”26 – and the reference is to law of
human, not higher, creation.
Among the grand theorists named above, the Justice and his jurisprudence deserve our
special attention, and this for at least these two reasons. First, unlike all the other grand theorists
named above, Justice Scalia is sometimes in position to implement his theory in the name of the
Constitution of the United States and without risk of being overruled by a higher court.27
Second, the Justice is, I wish to suggest, putting forward what those observant of inner law must
regard as a specially treacherous form of pseudo-law, a system of rules backed by a species of
authoritarianism. Justice Scalia’s well-known ‘just apply the rules of law’ injunction, reinforced
as it is by the common political bromides about the glories of democracy and the evils of
23

See Patrick McKinley Brennan, Against Sovereignty: A Cautionary Note on the Normative Power of the Actual,
82 Notre Dame Law Review 181 204-08 (2006).
24
On the move to make law to be the sovereign, see W.J. Stankiewicz, Aspects of Political Theory: Classical
Concepts in an Age of Relativism (London: Collier Macmillan, 1976), 62.
25
Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church (Vatican City:
Vatican City Press, 2004), 230, par. 408. The quotation, which itself is wholly a quotation from the encyclical
Centesimus Annus (1991), is from the English typical edition prepared and published in Rome. The official Latin
text of Centesimus Annus, though it does indulge in a personification of law, hardly seems to bear the English
translation given it by the drafters of the Compendium: “dominator potassium leges.”
26
Antonin Scalia, “Common-Law Courts in a Civil Law System,” in A Matter of Interpretation, ed. Amy Gutmann
(Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1997), 17.
27
See Farber and Sherry, Desperately Seeking Certainty, 29.

8

‘legislating from the bench,’ perhaps sounds banal or even common-sensical. Behind its
presuppositions and modes of proceeding, however, are entailments that, I would suggest, cut the
legs of law out from under it by removing all possible sources of authority.
Justice Scalia’s announced twin-aims have been to make what we do in the name of law
as much as possible (1) a system of rules contained in, or constructed from, (2) a closed universe
of texts. Textualism is the technical name for the second aim, and its boast, according to Justice
Scalia, is that, by treating as the law itself the “objectified intent” lodged in the text the lawgiver
promulgated, it delivers “a government of laws and not of men.”28
We look for a sort of “objectified” intent -- the intent that a reasonable person would
gather from the text of the law, placed alongside the remainder of the corpus juris. . . .
[T]he reason we adopt this objectified version is, I think, that it is simply incompatible
with democratic government, or indeed, even with fair government, to have the meaning
of a law determined by what the lawgiver meant, rather than by what the lawgiver
promulgated. . . . . . .

Men may enact what they will; but it is only the laws that they

enact which bind us.29
Texts, rather than the lawgivers’ meaning, are the law, and authority (or the lack thereof) is
hardly tarried over. What the lawgiver, a person (either individual or corporate), “meant” has
been suppressed to make way for a text, what the lawgiver “promulgated.” The limitation of the
judicial role to giving coercive effect to text delivered by the government printing office is a
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strategy that Justice Scalia took the occasion of a lecture at the Gregorian University in Rome to
defend in particularly poignant terms:
[M]y only authority as a judge to prevent the state from doing what may be bad things is
the authority that the majority has given to the courts. . . . To say, “Ah, but it is contrary
to the natural law”, is simply to say that you set yourself above the democratic state and
presume to decide what is good and what is bad in place of the majority of the people. I
do not accept that as a proper function. . . Yes, it is dogmatic democracy . . . .
I have been appointed to apply the Constitution and positive law. God applies the natural
law.30
Here, “authority” amounts to a democratically conferred license; the Justice’s “authority” is to
function, as much as possible, as something of a conduit for democratically generated texts and
the rules they contain.
To listen to Scalia describe the features of what he proposes, of textualism and “dogmatic
democracy,” one might suppose that he is doing little more than reporting what is largely beyond
dispute. Just beneath the surface of the description, however, just beyond the modest “All I urge
. . . ,” is a breathtaking campaign drastically to shorten (what H. Jefferson Powell refers to as)
“the list of legitimate modalities”31 by which to approach the work of a federal judge and, with it,
law in general.
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Like it or not, however, the grand theory urged must contend with the unacknowledged
fact that the Constitution simply does not fix the modalities of its own construction and
implementation, nor, for that matter, does it define “the Judicial Power” that it undertakes to
vest. These points are too plain to merit argument here. Whatever its merits or demerits,
textualism is one man’s (or a group’s) argument for a constitutional order of a certain kind. At
the very least, then, Scalia’s position should be acknowledged for what it is, “a proposal for
radical reform.”32 The “distinguishing features” of Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence are, in sum,
that “(1) it is a system; (2) it is a system selected for plainly pragmatic reasons. It represents an
intentional effort to diminish the role of discretion and personality in the judicial enterprise.” 33
That other Justices on the Court are up to more salacious mischief is no reason not
to put Justice Scalia to the test. I shall say a word about the upside of Scalia’s proposal at the
end, but the untoward consequences and implications of constructing and inhabiting a system
such as Scalia has in mind are my concern. According to the Justice, the people have spoken;
from now on, the law rules ex proprio vigore -- at least, that is, to the extent judges succeed in
that all-important legal work of hemming themselves by interdicting the search for meaning.
“Authority” amounts for Scalia simply to a democratically generated warrant, backed by the
coercive power of the state, to behave in certain ways allegedly fixed (or nearly fixed) by “legal”
texts. The axiomatic, asymptotic elimination of the human person by the interposition of a
system of texts entails the elimination of any possible source of genuine authority, that as
worthiness of respect and even intelligent obedience? Is this not the level on which we should
live?
32
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A possible preemptive reply would be to say that the democratically enacted text, given
effect by a constitutionally licensed judge, is itself just as much authority as one can hope for.
Such a reply becomes the more plausible the more one scratches the surface of Scalia’s
textualism and observes that the textualist judge, his claimed passivity notwithstanding, invents
and justifies his own role (through the aforementioned campaign for radical reform), thus
becoming a sort of sub rosa authority, at least to the extent that his plea for a “textualist”
judiciary succeeds in winning judicial adherents. To the extent, moreover, the textualist
succeeds in using law to create conditions in which justice has more of a chance of being done
(than by, say, the judicial “activists” Scalia fingers), there is objective merit in what he is
doing.34 So far, so good.
This line of reply eventually founders, however, on the fact that, whatever the admirable
consequences of his efforts, the textualist judge is engaged in a systematic campaign to eliminate
the problem of authority in law by eliminating the source of authority. This he does by severing
the link between, on the one hand, the meaning of texts human subjects create in the name of law
and, on the other, the meaning those texts will have in the mind and hands of the judge giving
them effect (and of the citizen receiving them and deciding what action to take).
Notwithstanding his vigorous protestations that his role is virtually supine, the textualist does not
so much conform to the meaning of the legal text, as he does construct it -- construct it, as he
says, without regard to what the lawgiver meant. Not looking for the real meaning of the text
(“what the lawgiver meant”), he supplies a meaning for “what the lawgiver promulgated.”35 The
decisive point is that the successful textualist has decamped from a world in which texts come to

34
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him with a meaning to be mined to a world of his own creation, a world in which he supplies the
legislator’s texts with a meaning of his own construction. One might call this an act or
appearance of authority -- except that it is, in fact, authoritarian, for the simple reason that it
amounts in the end to judicial ipse dixit. Yes, the textualist canvasses dictionaries and other
sources, but can they provide anything other than schedules of probable -- rather than real -meanings?36
The textualist judge turns out to be an ‘activist’ of a rambunctious sort, but meanwhile
the appearances (of his deference and passivity) are kept up. Persons are not allowed to appear -this in order to make text, as much as possible, the only appearance in law. The result is texts
awaiting the assignment of meaning, authority in abeyance. Joseph Vining catches the
underbelly of textualism and “dogmatic democracy,” its ineluctable lack of authority:
There is always an enormous difficulty, an enormous struggle in law particularly, to
recall and keep in mind that language is evidence of meaning, not meaning itself. The
struggle comes from the thirst to know, for closure, that can always be slaked for the
moment by illusion, but at a cost and often a terrible cost. The difficulty, the struggle, is
the difficulty of listening, and it is a person one listens to -- only a person, whom one
approaches in good faith, which includes faith that there is a person to be heard.
Axiomatic elimination of the person, at least from conscious presence in the reasoning
mind, is a way of cutting short the struggle, stopping the work of listening. It is precisely
the elimination of the person that permits one to think of rules not as linguistic evidence
but as having a real existence of their own. . . . . So there is always the temptation in law
to approach a statute as if its words had meanings in themselves and by themselves -- the
authoritarianism sometimes shown by those devoted to maintaining the supremacy of
36
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democratic politics and legislative authority. . . . But over the long run lawyers do not
succumb. They pull themselves away from the common temptation. Something that has
authority pulls you into the spirit of it. Without spirit there can be no authority. Without
authority there is no law.37

The trouble with a system such as Scalia’s, so Vining suggests, is that it does what it can
to hide -- and thus to leave unregulated -- the potential human sources of authority, thereby
becoming authoritarian in the name of “dogmatic democracy.” One might be tempted to reply
that the lawgiver’s texts really do carry authority lodged within themselves and that my fear for
authority’s absence is unfounded. But if black marks on white pages carry authority in
themselves, then perhaps too the etchings on rocks caused by centuries of random rubbings and
collisions? And the configurations of the clouds blowing by, and of sticks and twigs washed up
on the sea’s shore?
I submit that authority in law requires the presence and appearance of persons,
specifically, human subjects living out their orientation to the real and the valuable. Though
inevitably present in the legal world Justice Scalia confronts, these human sources of authority
are deliberately eclipsed and law’s claim to bind is loosed to the extent the eclipse succeeds. In
developing this thesis, I shall put particular emphasis on the work of Joseph Vining, whom
Steven Smith describes as “one of the most provocative but elusive legal thinkers of our time.”38
Whether the approach to authority can now be other than oblique, remains to be seen.

III. Diagnosing Denzingertheologie in Law?

37
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“Over the long run lawyers do not succumb . . . ,” Vining assures us. But Scalia
succumbs, and invites -- and sometimes forces -- the rest of us to come along. Gordon Wood has
opined that “[t]he real source of the judicial problem that troubles Justice Scalia lies in our
demystification of the law, which is an aspect of the general demystification of all authority that
has taken place in the twentieth century.” Wood suggests that perhaps we should “remystify
some of what lawyers and judges do”39 -- a suggestion Scalia would counter with the
unexceptionable observation that the bell announcing Legal Realism cannot be unrung.40 There
is another alternative, however, one that only requires that we get to know ourselves -- not
according to the reductive descriptions offered by the Realists, but as we really are. Rather than
“remystify” law, we might follow Joseph Vining and observe that what we do in law,
notwithstanding what we sometimes say about it, is everywhere full of the traces of genuine
authority, the legal manifestation of human spirit working itself out -- or, in my idiom, subjects
obedient to inner law. To observe and heed these appearances of authority is always a struggle,
one that Scalia rejects with his frank and final preference for a system of legal rules.
Why, we might ask, does Justice Scalia succumb? Why is Antonin Scalia, of all people,
engaged in an “intentional effort” to construct as closed a system of law as possible? “Dogmatic
democracy” and textualism do not make the only response to Legal Realism, and some of the
other possible responses, which mount a more frontal assault than Vining’s invitation to attend to
what we in fact do that breathes authority in law, appear quite in line with the Catholic tradition
that Scalia calls his own.41 Scalia’s Catholicity and Catholic erudition are concessa on all sides.
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Justice Scalia, without engaging in a pseudo-remystification project, indulging a single woolly
idea, or even struggling to follow Vining’s charting of authority’s pulse in the breadth and depth
of our legal practice, could take his stand with St. Thomas Aquinas and say, contra textualism
and “dogmatic democracy,” that an unjust law is no law at all (but instead a perversion of
reason).42 Antonin Scalia, of all people, knows better than that “God applies the natural law.”
He also knows that one can travel a long way with ‘legal positivism’ without denying, as
textualism welded to “dogmatic democracy” does, that positive law cannot violate the natural
law without thereby losing pro tanto its capacity to bind as a legal norm.43
George Kannar’s insightful study of Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence sheds light on this
question, and, by doing so, contributes to an answer to our guiding question about the locus of
authority in what we do in the name of law. Kannar’s critical insight is that Scalia the Catholic
was acculturated into a religio-theological world in which, when it comes to articulating what we
believe in, or to stating the norms by which we are to live, “we” either do nothing or as little as
possible -- or, at least, we cause ourselves to appear to do nothing or as little as possible. More
formative of Scalia’s legal mind than the “‘higher elements’ of the Catholic legal tradition” is,
according to Kannar, the approach to text and history that prevailed in those self-effacing religiotheological circles of Scalia’s youth. Kannar urges that “in understanding that experience, a page
of the Baltimore Catechism may be worth a volume of Aquinas.”44 Even more helpful than a
page of the Baltimore Catechism, I suggest, would be a page from the Enchridion Symbolorum
Amendments following the publication of the Edito Typica. Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana; Washington,
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Definitionum et Declarationum De Rebus Fidei Et Morum, the text that in many ways provides
the background not only to the Baltimore Catechism but to much else that grew up in Catholic
practice during the period before the 1950s and 1960s.
Although Catholics who knew the Church before the Second Vatican Ecumenical
Council (1962–65) were plenty familiar with the idea that in the Church’s magisterium there is
‘authority,’ paradoxically the magisterium and many of the Church’s influential theologians
minimized the need for or function of the voice of authority in the life of Catholics. (Which no
doubt has something to with why so many Catholics of that period sadly, and unnecessarily, see
the Church as an authoritarian institution). The appearance sometimes created was one of the
theologian or teaching-Church engaged in a kind of ventriloquism. The method is described by
Bernard Lonergan:
What Karl Rahner refers to as Denzingertheologie, the late Pierre Charles of Louvain
named Christian positivism. It conceived the function of the theologian to be that of a
propagandist for church doctrines. He did his duty when he repeated, explained,
defended just what had been said in church documents. He had no contribution of his
own to make and so there could be no question of his possessing any autonomy in
making it.45

This way of doing theology takes the epithet by which it is known from the Enchiridion,
the book of quotations from papal and conciliar pronouncements originally edited by Heinrich
Denzinger in 1854.46 As the tome went through dozens of editions over a century and a half,
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Denzinger was succeeded by other editors of course, including the estimable theologian Karl
Rahner, S.J. (1904–1984), but Denzinger’s name remained and named a method of theology
enabled by the handy book of quotations. The practitioner of Denzingertheologie proceeded by
adducing proof-texts that were treated as timeless nuggets to be arranged and re-arranged as
fresh situations might invite. The Church, in reaching new formulations of these dogmatic truths,
was neither adding nor subtracting, merely giving new expression. This is a complex
phenomenon that is not readily summarized, but Kannar captures its thrust:
[The Catholic world-view sought] to reduce thought to “formulae” rather than to inspire a
deeper reflection on ultimate historical or moral values, or on any abstract higher law.
‘The mode of theology was constant -- a simultaneous linking and severing in the
Scholastic distinguo. To know the terms was to know the thing, to solve the problem. So
we learned, and used, a vast terminology,’ all in the service of a life-absorbing, habitforming ‘urge to codify reality and capture it in rules.’ . . . Linguistic essentialism seems
second-nature. To reject ‘policy’ as a starting point is thus a rather easy thing to do.47
This was the world of a decadent scholasticism, in which “[t]he chair is still the chair of Moses,
but it is occupied by scribes and Pharisees. Traditional doctrine is still taught, but it is no longer
convincing. The religious order still reads out the rules, but one may doubt that the home fires
are still burning.”48 In such a world, some people’s ideal theologian comes to resemble “a parrot
with nothing to do but repeat what has already been said.”49
Such was the way of much of the Catholic world in the period immediately before the
Second Vatican Council did its work. It is often said that the Council -- the definitive event in
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the modern life of the Catholic Church -- ‘made changes’ in the Church. As regards discipline
and practice, this is plainly true. At least as important, though, is the Council’s work on change
itself: “The meaning of Vatican II was the acknowledgment of history.”50 The point Lonergan
thus makes epigrammatically, and expounds and elaborates extensively elsewhere, is that at
Vatican II the Church recognized her place in an ongoing process called history.51 No longer
pretending to live outside of time and above change, the Church reinstated reality -- which
includes the “deposit of faith” as well as the warp and woof of the change in which it is
transmitted and received -- as the object of concern and inquiry. Moving from what Lonergan
called the “classicist” to the “historicist” operative stance, the Church recognized that her call to
live in and by the truth entails the subordination of texts, even inspired texts, to fresh insights
into those texts and the reality they concern.52 In its Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation
(Dei verbum), the Council explained that “There is a growth in insight into the realities and
words that are being passed on.”53 Texts were thus freed to be the contingent and conditioned -if hugely important, and, in the case of Scripture, inspired -- helps to understanding reality that
they are.
What exactly the Church acknowledged in this connection at Vatican II is much
debated,54 but present purposes do not require the taking of a stand on a disputed question. This
much is beyond dispute: any acknowledgment of change -- and there was some -- makes
inescapable the question of what assures or guarantees, if anything does, that such change will be
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in the right direction. In short, without timeless texts as a putative last word, the role of authority
in both assuring authentic development and preventing false development is out in the open.
Thus exposed, the question has been the occasion of a most vigorous debate over the last nearly
half-century. With respect to growth in insight into divine revelation, however, Dei verbum
already affirmed that those “in the episcopate,” to whom as a group in union with the Bishop of
Rome the “deposit of faith” is entrusted, possess “the sure charism of truth” (“charisma veritatis
certum”).55 The question of authority can be debated, but there is no question but that the Church
will not err in its interpretation of the deposit of faith. Thus the magisterium of the Church, on
herself and on divine revelation.
When it comes to matters of state and statecraft, however, there can of course be no hope
of landing anyone or a group possessed of “the sure charism of truth,” -- indeed, we justly fear
and flee those who are cocksure of themselves as concerns the extent of our and the neighbors’
civil liberties. The Church’s divine assurance of not slipping into error assures that the
discussion will concern how -- not whether -- her teaching is certainly true as concerns divine
revelation and what is contained in it. Architects of state, by contrast, lacking all assurance of
access to the truth about human living, are remitted to what means of argument meet the test of
our desire for the real and the valuable. To return to a proximate example, even textualism in
constitutional interpretation is not self-certifying, a point even Justice Scalia would be quick to
concede (preferring to end his regress with “dogmatic democracy”).56 We are possessed of a
Constitution and a tradition of its interpretation, but even for the legal force of these a case must
be made out, minds persuaded.

49

Flannery, Second Vatican, 754.
For a helpful survey of these issues, with a particular emphasis on Scalia’s normative argument for
originalism/textualism, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Implementing the Constitution (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ.
Press, 2001), 13–25.

56

20

In sum, the Church put away positivism by reminding us that what matters is living
according to the truth, not according to formulations; Justice Scalia, by contrast, has staked his
claim, and our collective living, on the legal analogue of Denzingertheologie. Can we blame
him? Justice Scalia holds the view that statecraft has nothing to contribute to salvation.57 No
doubt anticipating an eschatological rectification of the whole grand mess, Scalia would commit
us for now to the legal analogue of “Christian positivism.” Leaving it to God to implement the
natural law, Scalia takes his rest on a system of texts. Again: “[T]here is always the temptation
in law to approach a statute as if its words had meanings in themselves and by themselves -- the
authoritarianism sometimes shown by those devoted to maintaining the supremacy of democratic
politics and legislative authority.”

IV. Resisting the Temptation -- Holding Out for Authority
“When literate cultures are in crisis, the crisis is most evident in the question of what they
do with their exemplary written texts.”58 Scalia is an important phase in -- not the whole of -legal history; “over the long run lawyers do not succumb.” But if they do not succumb -because they discern that nothing less than living in a way equal to our human dignity is at issue,
still we have to ask exactly how it is that we can use texts in law without becoming authoritarian
about them. If Scalia’s solution to the problem of human living has the faults that we have been
outlining, still we should not underestimate the problem to which textualism sometimes seems to
be the solution. As Mary Ann Glendon has commented cryptically but clearly enough, “Our
legal culture also explains why many friends of democratic and rule-of-law values have been
57
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driven to expound what most civil lawyers would regard as excessively rigid forms of
textualism.”59 Texts have the apparent advantage that they are there to be paid attention to -whereas everyone acknowledges that authority, even if it be real, is nothing anyone can touch or
point toward.
Although there is occasionally serious discussion of it in the Anglo-American
jurisprudential literature, authority remains an outlier in scholarship on law.60 In fact, from the
threshold law’s initiation rites disparage the conditions of authority, only half by accident. I
refer to the ‘orientation’ in which first-year law students are told -- frequently by instructors
reciting some out-of-date, photocopied text that has been provided by someone ‘in charge of
orientation’ -- that our way of doing law, which will be the object of their attention for the next
three years of their lives, affirms and depends upon ‘a hierarchy of authorities.’ But such stilted
discourse rings hollow, and within days or at most weeks, dis-orientation takes hold. No longer
delayed by questions of ‘authority’ and implausible ‘hierarchies’ of the same, students are busy
dividing the legal engine between ‘law’ and the lawless, that is, between ‘black letter law’ and
‘policy.’ Echoing too many professors and a profusion of ‘study guides,’ law’s students have
begun to imagine that law is what it is and speaks for itself; and policy, no one need be told, has
always its advocates to advocate for it. This is only one man’s report from the classroom, but he
has heard the basis of it a thousand times: “Professor, are you making a policy argument or is
this the black-letter law you’re talking about?” As for Justice Scalia, it’s just as simple as that -or, at least, one can always say that it’s that simple.
But practicing lawyers, or at least the better ones, know better -- know that texts are not
as handy as the textualist would have you believe and that ‘policy’ isn’t an adequate description
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of the what-else that goes into making law. Lawyers do not just find texts, black-marks packed
with rules ready to be dislodged and ‘applied,’ or dislodged and then massaged with policy until
ripe to be given effect. Lawyers turn to texts alright, but as part of a process very different from
the one outlined during ‘orientation.’ As Vining observes, “the texts to which they turn are
selected and are old, necessarily from the past, requiring translation over time and between
languages and places, year to year, decade to decade.”61 Denzinger left the texts in the Greek or
Latin in which he found them, but he did do the work of selection for generations of Catholic
theologians, many of whom forgot that there had been selecting62 -- this despite the introductory
note “Selectio documentorum,” and the additional introductory note on the authority of the
included selections, “Valor documentorum.” Lawyers lack a Denzinger. As practicing lawyers
know, they -- and judges too -- must do their own selecting.
Denzinger limited his selections to papal and conciliar pronouncements, for reasons that
find ready (though by no means uniform) resonance in the Catholic tradition. But what are the
practicing lawyer’s or the sitting judge’s principles of exclusion and inclusion? It would seem to
be at least in part a matter of “selection” that the Constitution of the United States rather than,
say, the Articles of Confederation or the Code of Justinian, or a recipe on a shelf in Gary
Lawson’s kitchen63 is to be consulted for what is to be law for us here and now -- but on what
principle? The constitutions and statutes of forgotten empires line the walls of the great
museums and libraries, but are they to be selected? What of “foreign law?” What of the
assertions by members of the current Supreme Court that foreign sources of law should -- or

61

Vining, From Newton’s Sleep, 239.
Mary Ann Hinsdale, to pick one example, describes Denzinger’s Enchiridion as “a comprehensive catalogue of
official pronouncements of popes and councils.” Mary Ann Hinsdale, “Infinite Openness to the Infinite: Karl
Rahner’s Contribution to Modern Catholic Thought on the Child,” in The Child in Christian Thought, ed. Marcia
Bunge (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2001), 406, 414 n. 29.
63
See Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85 Geo. Law Journal 1823 (1997).
62

23

should not -- be consulted? ‘Overruling’ is a fact of legal life the legitimacy of which no one
denies; but if Plessy v. Ferguson is still ‘on the books’ -- or at least ‘in’ the U.S. Reports, but
presumably it is no longer evidence of what is law for us. And so forth.
Resisting this destabilizing claim, an objector will object that “surely” what the
legislature, “our legislature,” gives us is “the law.” “Certainly,” it will be said, “what the U.S.
Congress casts into the world, that has gone un-vetoed and survived judicial-review, is law for us
in America. Which is why,” the etymologically-edified objector will continue, “we call it a
legislature, not a consideration-bearer. Surely, at least within the confines of these United States,
what the Congress launches is law, it being granted on all sides that in a cloistered monastery
lodged on the coast of a remote island on the opposite side of the world, what the U.S. Congress
issues by way of the Government Printing Office is no more ‘the law’ than is the wisdom of a
Doonesbury cartoon that appears on the same day.”
What this well-intentioned line of objection overlooks is how and why even here and
now, the achievement of Congress’s voting for, promulgating, and publishing some black marks,
which then go un-vetoed by the President and survive ‘judicial review,’ does not as such achieve
law for us. As Vining says, “Statutes and regulations are only candidates for attention, not just in
competition for enforcement resources, but in the very analysis of situations. This is to be
observed historically from without. It is also experienced by lawyers, from within.”64 Vining
softens the blow of this insight by exemplifying the point from another continent:
The piece of writing that emerges from Parliament is not the law. It is evidence of the
law, which is used in the course of arriving at a statement of law. . . . Legislation is the
arbitrary which we allow -- but also limit. To make the point in its strongest form, it
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could be said legislation is lawless behavior, except that by a paradoxical trick we make
legislative statutes materials we use in determining what the law is.65
To take a more proximate example from contemporary administrative law as it is practiced on
this continent, section 706 the Administrative Procedure Act (1946) states that a “reviewing
court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside” agency action that fails any one of a number of
statutorily defined criteria. But when, in 2002, it was presented with an argument that it must set
aside an agency action that it had found unlawful, the United States Court of Appeals for D.C.
Circuit said, per Judge Silberman, that it “is simply not the law” that it must set aside the
unlawful agency action; and for this proposition of discretion to decide whether to set aside the
unlawful agency action, Judge Silberman cited earlier precedent of the same court decided in
1993 (while ignoring the contrary precedent decided in 1994).66 To say what the law is, requires
taking all this -- what is said or not said, what is done or not done -- into consideration.
To put the point more broadly, the possibility of the executive veto, which invites the
possibility of the super-majority; the possibility of judicial invalidation on review or on collateral
attack -- these are but incidents of legislative text’s not being law ex proprio vigore. With
exceptions that prove the rule, we do not give effect as law what we cannot or will not say is
worthy of being acted upon intelligently. No lawyer arguing to a court about the correct
disposition of agency action found unlawful can ignore section 706; at the same time, it would
fly in the face of intelligent practice to ignore that the text has not been dispositive of what has
been done in all cases in which it was relevant. Lawyers and others engaged in the process of
ascertaining the law look both to what has been, and to what is being, done:
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Words of law are not givens of the world . . . . The very words themselves are not given.
They are found. Even focal texts, that become concrete particulars of the lawyer’s world
from time to time, carry no meaning a lawyer can reach up and break off like a bit of
crystal. Constructing a statement of law to be acted upon, a lawyer constantly seeks a
real meaning, drawn from all the evidence. The evidence is not only other words. It
includes action, what is done.67
And this fact about what we do, that trumps what we sometimes say, brings us nearer the heart of
the matter. We might say that the principle of exclusion and inclusion is given in part by
something operative inside the lawyer engaged in what we call ‘the legal process.’ In Vining’s
way of putting it, “The past and its texts enter the experience of legal authority through legal
method and its presuppositions, which are subtler than statements commonly made about them
would suggest . . . .”68
Lost on -- or denied by -- the maestro who looks for law exactly in text is the fact that
before there can be law, there is a person making a decision. Democratically enacted rules of
general applicability -- whatever their wisdom and whatever their appeal to Friedrich Hayek -do not of their own vigor rise to the level of law for any community. No particular text or
assemblage of texts stands as the law; and though it makes sense as a kind of shorthand to refer
(as we do) to law’s textual sources as the law itself, it makes nonsense of law to go on then to
imagine that it exists apart from decisions leading to conduct. “There is always, in law, a
decision maker, and what are called rules in law are expressions of considerations to be taken
into account by a decision maker.” Vining continues:
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They focus not on themselves as a self-contained system but upon decision-making
activity pointing forward. Talk of rights and rules of a static kind, projecting an image of
law standing off by itself, obscures the focus that legal rules have in fact, always a
decision that must be made, at the edge of lives that have not been lived before, in a
world that has not been seen before.69
Again, what the simplifications of the positivists and codifiers miss, in their efforts to get law
nailed down, is that there is no law unless decisions are being made to guide conduct in the name
of law. The question of what conduct is proper or permissible is a question of concrete fact, and
unless we are talking about guides to conduct, we aren’t quite talking about law, though we may
be talking about its sources or about what gives evidence of it. And when it comes to what
should shape and structure our guides to conduct in the inevitable thick of life’s particulars,
nothing is ruled out a priori, at least not absolutely.
Lawyers do not have nice specifications of what evidence can be looked to when
inquiring what the law is on a matter. There is a technique, which is to focus on a canon
of texts and, if they are available, upon central texts generated by an institutional
arrangement that is usually hierarchical in form. But in reading those texts, reading them
seriously to understand them, lawyers do not “exclude evidence” (as a litigating lawyer
would say), close their eyes to evidence of meaning (or lack of meaning). Some of that
evidence is of the kind we call sociological. All of the evidence is about the life of the
aspirations and ways of thinking with which lawyers work . . . There is as a consequence
no notion of the “purely legal.” Legal discourse is not a closed system. The meaning of
texts is a real meaning.70
69
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Why must this be so? Because it is intelligent human life and aspirations that are at issue/
We do not confront “law” as largely inert automatons: We come to law, and deciders create law,
because of the constitutive human eros to discover the truth and to discover and instantiate the
valuable. We can do less, but what essays in ‘law’ that start some place other than with the
importunate human subject miss is that law is about us, about us as we are and might yet
become. ‘Law’ that does not respond to our genuine needs reaches us as that “unintelligible
restraint.” Law is a tool to assist in satisfying the human longing – the demand of inner law -- to
discover and live by the truth and to discover and instantiate the valuable; what fails to fulfill this
function fails pro tanto to be law. Like other artifacts of our human creation, law cannot be used
-- except perversely -- to frustrate the purposes, both those given and those chosen -- of those
who create it and who need it, of those always, already subject to inner law.
With respect to texts specifically, it is inevitable that those who create them today in aid
of human living risk that those who come the next day will live in the past and dodge the day.
But the practicing lawyer, tightly situated within the practical matrix of the work of making
statements of law to be lived by, will -- and, we can say, should -- use the inherited texts not to
dodge, but to meet, today’s exigencies. That he sometimes does what he knows to be less is not
an argument for settling for less in what we do in the name of law. Inner law does not go on
holiday.
This subordination of texts in law to the (life) project of which they are a part risks
appearing to undervalue texts, so it will be worthwhile to emphasize why this appearance would
be false. It is easy to identify the shortcomings of Denzingertheologie without appearing to
slight the relevant texts, for no one engaged in Christian theology flirts with jettisoning sacred
text. When, however, we observe that practicing lawyers regard -- and argue that practicing
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lawyers should regard -- texts as potential contributors to statements of law, not as the law itself
and by itself, then we can seem to some insufficiently appreciative of text. What good lawyers
do with text is very much like what students of sacred texts do with their texts, however, and the
reasons for this similarity, overlap, as Vining observes:
Close reading, reading in every detail and in every way, is at the very center of what
lawyers qua lawyers do, and other parts of lawyers’ method and the institutional structure
of law are designed to make close reading possible. Anything closely read and reread
must be there some time, always aging, if only to permit rereading. The rereading of
some texts, the Confucian, the Vedaic, the Torah, for example, may go on forever.
But the large fact remains that in law focal texts, no matter how old, are not fixed. No
legal text is immune from challenge and substitution, not even statute or constitutional
provision. If one does not understand a text despite all efforts of one’s own and others, if
in the end it does not fit, has no resonance, it then cannot hold its place. . . .
No one, again, simply mouths the words of legal texts. They are read for their meaning,
translated, restated by one who, responsible for the effects of what he says and does, will
give orders or contribute to orders as he believes himself to be ordered by what he hears.
The search for authority is a search for a voice beyond the brute facts of the past
unfolding into the present.71

Lawyers, like priests, turn to texts; and they pay them most careful heed. But just as the
priest does not elide the text at hand with the Word of God, the lawyer does not substitute text
for law. Lawyers turn to texts, which they have selected and arranged; these they read
assiduously, not to echo them but in aid of making a statement of law to be acted upon. But that
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statement, though not determined by text, is not ungoverned: It must satisfy the speaker’s need
to speak only what is worthy of being acted on. What gives the statement its worthiness to be
acted upon? The answer, which I have been suggesting, is encapsulated in this passing
observation by Lonergan: “one has only to peruse such a collection of conciliar and pontifical
pronouncements as Denzinger’s Enchiridion Symbolorum to observe that each is a product of its
place and time and that each meets the questions of the day for the people of the day.”72 One can
turn to texts to engage in archaeology, or to find palindromes, or to . . . . . One can generate texts
to entertain, to edify, or to . . . Alternatively, one can turn to texts, and one can generate texts, in
aid of meeting “the questions of the day for the people of the day” as concerns their living in
community where, in the name of the community, justified coercion can be used to back certain
kinds of conduct and eliminate others.
In this seemingly innocuous formulation -- “meet[ing] the questions of the day for the
people of the day” -- is contained the very heart of the matter, the core of a whole philosophy of
law for worthy human living. Those who would say what the law is, and thus, expect obedience
and not mere strategic compliance, must be meeting the questions of the day. Those not meeting
the questions of the day are not worthy of being listened to by the people of the day, certainly not
worthy of being obeyed by the people of the day. It would be a violation of their (our) own
obligation to honor inner law to subordinate themselves (ourselves) to authorities ignoring their
(our) questions. Those not meeting the questions of the day for the people of the day are, as
lawyers say, irrelevant and immaterial -- and perhaps even prejudicial. Those worth listening to
and obeying, because they do meet the questions of the day for the persons of the day, speak with
authority. Vining says of the mind that possesses authority that it possesses it in virtue of its
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caring. “For law, mind is caring mind. Mind that does not care is no mind to seek, no mind to
take into oneself, no mind to obey: it has no authority.”73
In the idiom I introduced at the outset, the mind possessed of authority is the human
subject who is obedient to inner law. To be meeting the questions of the day for the people of
the day -- through all the quotidian researching, selecting, interpreting, evaluating, drafting,
revising, submitting, arguing, re-arguing, collaterally attacking, and so forth -- is to be meeting
that constitutive human eros that orders us out of ourselves to discover and affirm what is and
what is valuable and, then, to live accordingly. It is the very process of answering the questions
that issue from our rational nature itself that generates authority. The process is not ungoverned,
but neither does the constitutive criterion to which it is subject enter arbritrarily or violently. The
eros for the real and the valuable enters from the lawyer’s own rational subjectivity; and though
we are passive with respect to its entering, it enters, unless we block it for the time being. It
never coerces our compliance, however, but awaits free obedience. This constitutive eros for the
real and the valuable, “the pure question,” must by mistaken for the degenerate phenomenon that
is idle curiosity or episodic questioning; it is, rather, the unrestricted desire to know the real and
the valuable, which manifests itself in ever fresh questions that we can either meet or evade. 74
“Name it what you please,” this eros drives and structures our worthy human living, and
it does not make an exception for law, not even for “dogmatic democracy.” Refusing to be
dogmatic, it asks to govern the practicing lawyer’s use of texts in aid of coming to decisions of
law to be acted upon. This is not to make the silly claim that the work-a-day practicing lawyer is
thematically aware of “inner law;” the suggestion is, rather, that when he or she is struggling to
speak with the requisites of authority, the practicing lawyer obeying inner law; and that when he
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or she is nagged by the injustice of unanswered questions and loose ends not tied up, it is the
violation of inner law that is registering in conscience.
In sum: Those living in conformity with inner law avoid the temptation to transmute our
quest for law into the imposition of unintelligible restraint. Awaiting our dedication to meeting
its demands, inner law does not coerce us. The “pure question” reaches us from within, not ab
extra, and it constitutes our very rationality and intelligence; choosing to honor it is to live on the
level of the dignity of our rational natures. To do less remains possible, but settling for less
leaves our normative and unrestricted demand for answers to the questions unmet, our human
potential denied. “Every closing off, blocking, denial of the empirically, intelligently, rationally,
freely, responsibly conscious subject is also a closing off, a blocking, of the dominance of the
higher aspirations of the human spirit and the human heart.”75 What we cannot do, without
violating inner law, is to meet some questions arbitrarily or ignore others: “Negatively, . . . the
unrestricted desire excludes the unintelligent and uncritical rejection of any question, and
positively the unrestricted desire demands the intelligent and critical handling of every
question.”76 The human subject who dodges questions lacks authority, even in ‘law.’

V. Locating Authority in Law: the Problem of Authorities
We have traced law to authority, and authority to mind obedient to inner law; not text, but
the mind meeting the questions of the day for the persons of the day speaks with authority. But
not everyone who can speak with authority can go on to bind with the coercive power of the law
backed by the might of ‘the state.’ We confront, therefore, the relationship between authority
and authorities.
75

Bernard Lonergan, “The Human Good as Object: Differential and Integration” in The Collected Works of Bernard
Lonergan eds. Robert M. Doran and Frederick Crowe, (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1993), 10: 63.
76
Lonergan, Insight, 638.

32

A brute fact that frequently comes down to us from the past, and frequently obscures the
line between authority and authoritarianism, concerns authorities, a fact reflected in the
ambivalent connotation and denotation of this English word ‘authorities.’ Sometimes the
‘authorities’ are law enforcement folk conspicuous for their bluntness; other times the
‘authorities’ are those who will get the work of justice done. When we ‘call in the authorities,’
or the authorities just arrive on the scene, we hope for the latter, but fear the former. We face the
fact of men and women who ask to be regarded as authorities over us; the critical issue is to
distinguish between those authorities who possess authority and those who cloak the
authoritarian in legal garb. “The barbarian may wear a Brooks Brothers suit.”77
The problem -- we can call it the problem of the authoritarianism of false authorities -grows out of the conditions of cooperation. Acting alone, we can get very little done; reinventing the wheel assures either boredom or, in the alternative, an early demise. Cooperation,
both across the ages and in the here and now, gets things done, and makes maintenance, and
perhaps then improvement, possible. Cooperation can occur quite spontaneously, but the limits
of spontaneous cooperation prove to be severe. Cooperation, if it is to continue, must be
regularized. The more cooperation is reticulated, ramified, and reinforced, the more powerful it
becomes, and the more that can be accomplished. Spontaneity gives way to custom, and custom
gives way to more formalized institutions. Offices are created, defined, and populated. Those
who populate the offices we know as authorities, that is, “the officials to whom certain offices
have been entrusted and certain powers delegated.”78
As long as the authorities remain faithful to their offices and to the purposes for which
those offices were created, and as long as conditions remain unchanged, things go as they did
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from the beginning. But conditions do not remain unchanged among the living. At the very
least, new questions emerge. To take another example from administrative law, the question
arises whether it would not be better for those charged with administering government benefits to
proceed according to a grid rather than on a case-by-case basis? Would this not tend to assure
more thoroughly informed and, therefore, intelligent results?79 We might be able to go on doing
things the old way, but these new questions invite new answers. Correlatively, the fact of new
learning clarifies the possibility, and invites satisfaction of the conditions of, progressive and
cumulative learning. Cooperation is not just horizontal; as I observed above, it can be vertical
and span the ages. In order to meet the questions of the day, changes will have to be made to
accommodate and assure new learning (without becoming amnesiac about what we already
know, condemning ourselves to reinventing the wheel).
Meeting the questions of the day for the people of the day means keeping up with new
questions. To the extent, however, that offices have been designed and parceled out in a brittle
way, the office holders will lay claim to terra firma on which to resist new questions and the new
directions in which they might lead. And even offices designed and parceled out with an
openness to adaptation may by now be populated by authorities who have grown officious;
instead of continuing the pattern of growing and ramifying cooperation that produced and
populated the offices in the first place, the authorities dig in their heals and rule some challenges
out of court. Today’s questions are stifled; the possibility of progressive and cumulative
learning, and with it more developed living, is denied. Stasis sets in and then is enforced; people
begin to talk about the offices as though informed by Platonic Forms. “[M]y only authority as a
judge to prevent the state from doing what may be bad things is the authority that the majority
has given to the courts.”
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To press the mutability of offices is not to call for (what Judge Noonan once referred to
as) “a roving constitutional convention;” indeed, quite the reverse. It won’t do to live, as
Michael Oakeshott said of Descartes, every day as though it were one’s first. For the reasons I
have been developing, offices need to be structured in such a way as to facilitate drawing on and
further developing (and, as necessary) correcting the inherited knowledge and wisdom. Nothing
short of “the stages of human historical process” depend on people’s success in developing
methods for becoming “more reasonable and responsible in the various arrangements of their
cooperative and personal living.”80 The creation of offices that allow us to live more reasonably
and responsibly, by meeting the questions of the day, is the low door in the wall that leads to a
decent or perhaps even better future. As Joseph Flanagan observes portentously: “We can mark
off the major periods in the history of culture by the way different historical communities control
[the] functions of knowing and choosing, or by the different methods that cultures have
developed to govern their personal and collective making of history.”81 The key is to keep the
offices in service of living, in service -- that is, not of the status quo ante, but of progressive and
cumulative learning that meets the questions of each new day.
The original parcelings-out of office, by custom and usage, were justified in fact by their
contributing to meeting the questions of the day for the people of the day. As custom and usage
gives way to law, the legalistic solution is always just around the regulatory corner. Legalism
enjoys some of law’s aura and prestige, but is much more efficient. Its peculiar genius is not to
get hung up on the questions of the day; its flaw is that, at least in the long run, it would prove
fatal for the persons whose questions go unmet. Of course, if we succeed in ignoring or denying,
first, that persons have questions about how to live and live well, or, second, that in that failing to
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meet them in our collective living is to violate the inner law that we humans have in common,
then we inure ourselves to some of the consequences of their going unanswered. We get used to
that phenomenon identified by the philosopher-historian Eric Voegelin as the interdict on the
question,82 and so it happens that “[a] society in decline digs its collective grave with arresting
efficiency.”83
A complete anaesthesia of the desire for the real and the valuable -- an effective
repression of the pure question -- is a rare occurrence, however. Whatever the case with the
neighbors (or the aliens or the poor or the disenfranchised) and what we hear said to be ‘good
enough’ for them, we have our own -- and those we love and care about have their own -questions. We want to know this world, to know what is valuable. Inner law keeps inviting us to
transcend the isolation of pure interiority, inviting us to answer and not to interdict the questions
that are our bridge to the real and the good. Our wanting to be knowers, our wanting to be
people who discover the valuable -- this is half, but only half, of the core of authority in law.
Not only do we desire to know the valuable; we also and concomitantly desire to
instantiate it in our living. This is the other half. Just as knowing has its conditions (which are
either satisfied or not), however, so, too, does instantiating the valuable. Desiring and knowing
the valuable are not sufficient to the realization of its instances. There is nothing abstract or armchair about this: Concretely, succeeding -- realizing the valuable in our living --requires
cooperation, and cooperation works itself out in social structures. Social structures -- such as
economies, school districts, clubs, and corporations -- succeed by helping us meet the questions
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of the day; they fail, and they cause us to fail, by leaving our questions unanswered, by stifling
further questions.84
The social structure that is the legal system, our current concern, is good at getting us
authorities, but the question ever remains whether the authorities are assisting us in meeting the
questions of the day, questions about how to instantiate the valuable here and now, and
tomorrow. Authorities who do in fact assist us in this project possess authority; they lack
authority who block or fail to assist our common engagement in this process of creating and
developing structures that lead to instances of valuable living. In the context of law, the other
half of authority’s core consists of the concrete conditions in which we succeed in instantiating
the valuable in our living.
The locus of authority in what we do in the name of law, then, is the community engaged
in the ongoing work of asking and answering questions about the real and the valuable and
creating the conditions for the progressive and cumulative entrance of knowledge about and the
realization of what is truly valuable. Authority appears in the concrete judgments the
community’s decision-makers -- the community’s ‘authorities’ -- reach in the name of the law.
But though those appearances of authority are the personal achievements of individual human
subjects, they would lack the authority necessary to be law for the community to the extent that
they did not reflect and bear the community’s inherited but cutting-edge insights into valuable
living. Not for any reason having to do with the priority of “democracy,” but because of the
community’s non-fungible accumulation of wisdom into the conditions of valuable living and
ongoing engagement with the questions of the day, the community possesses authority.
Descartes, by assaying to live every day as though it were his first, cut himself off from the
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community and thus from the possibility of meeting the questions of the day for the people, other
than himself, of the day. Those who are meeting the questions of the day for the people of the
day enjoy authority; those who are doing this on behalf of the community and with authorization
to give it effect, even coercive effect if necessary, are the locus of authority in law.
Bernard Lonergan identifies authority with “the community that has a common field of
experience, common and complementary ways of understanding, common judgments and
common aims.”85 If there is a terminological trouble with this identification, it concerns
Lonergan’s locating authority in the community without regard to the nature and quality of that
community’s field of common judgments and aims.86 On Lonergan’s usage, a community of
persons would enjoy authority no matter how dogmatically closed it was to further learning.
Lonergan does go on at once to distinguish between “authentic” and “unauthentic” fields of
common judgments and aims, and, thus, between authentic authority and unauthentic authority.
Fundamentalist communities would therefore possess authority, but lack “authentic authority.”
Lonergan’s usage is workable, but it would seem more to the point, and truer to common usage,
to identify as authority -- and authoritative -- the community that is engaged in and committed to
furthering judgments and aims that ask and answer the questions of the day, and as authoritarian
the community that is collectively engaged in blocking the asking and answering of questions.
We began by inquiring “the locus of authority in what we do in the name of law.” We
have answered by tracing such authority to the community, more specifically, a community
‘living by the question’ -- that is, engaged in a common enterprise of asking and answering
questions and then cumulatively and progressively creating the conditions that allow living by

85

Bernard J.F. Lonergan, “Dialectic of Authority,” in A Third Collection,18.
Max Weber identified “authority” with “domination,” and then distinguished “authority” from “legitimate
authority,” thereby beginning a tradition that tends to assimilate authority to domination. For Weber’s usage, see
Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: Univ. of Cal. Press, 1968), 1:31, 53..

86

38

the results. Decisions guiding conduct and taken in the name of law rise to the level of law for
the community by their being bearers of the community’s present body of insight into valuable
living and the means of its achievement. The creation and preservation of texts can aid the
progressive and cumulative development of insight into such human living and the creation of
conditions therefor; approached another way and with lesser purposes, the same texts can stunt
or block valuable human living. If, as the possibility of progressive and cumulative results will
demand, the community ‘transmits’ its authority to agents with specific offices, thereby creating
authorities, satisfaction of the conditions of authority ever remains necessary if the authorities are
not to sink to the level of authoritarian bureaucrats.87
As to exactly how those conditions can be satisfied once such a transmission has been
effected, something remains to be said in the final Section. What I would emphasize first,
however, is that to the extent that the authorities have given up being part of a communal project
of asking and answering questions -- that is, if, in Lonergan’s idiom, they have given up being
authentic -- to that extent they have divested themselves of authority. Nor, would it matter that
the office ‘requires’ this of them. Authorities may continue to wear the externalia, the badges of
office that allow them to be recognized and distinguished from the vigilante; but unless they are
in fact bearers of the community’s learning about and quest for valuable living, they are mere
authorities who lack authority. Whether someone merely wears the badges of office or actually,
in addition, possesses authority -- this remains always a question of concrete fact.
Besides authority there are also needed authorities. If there are to be authorities, then
over and above their authenticity there is needed some external criterion by which their
position can be publicly recognized. But while this external condition is a necessary
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condition, it is not a sufficient condition. The sufficient condition must include
authenticity. The external criterion need not be accompanied by authenticity. For in
human beings authenticity always is precarious. Commonly, indeed, it is no more than a
withdrawal from unauthenticity.

Such, then, is the dialectic of authority.88

Authorities do not necessarily act with authority. There is the ultra vires act; more
fundamentally, there is the act by the authority that, forsaking what authority it might have
enjoyed, becomes officious and ceases to engage in meeting the questions of the day for the
people of the day. By not allowing the questions of the day to occur, the authority decamps from
authority to the authoritarian. It can be subtle, but its effect is blunt. Correlatively, authority,
and with it law, is forever a fragile achievement.

VI. The Dialectic of Authority: A Sure End to “Sovereignty”
This dialectic, “the dialectic of authority,” will come as a disappointment to some.
Among the disappointed will be those who had hoped to get on in law with as little appearance
of genuine authority as possible; for these, such as Justice Scalia, the admission of authority in
law, as other than a democratically sanctioned license, amounts to a necessity to be minimized.
Also among the disappointed will be those who, frankly admitting the need for non-marginal
authority in the legal enterprise, would lodge and cabin it in firmly delineated offices and their
officious personnel; for these, linking authority -- and, with it, law -- to a ‘dialectic’ undermines
the very solidity that law and its rule of rules were supposed to be about. But this dialectic,
88
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though not what many had wanted, may be just what we need; it is, in any event, the best we can
do, though we often do much less.
Or, rather, seen from another angle, we often purport to do very much more. Law that is
nothing short of “sovereign” is what David Dudley Field boasted. The alternative position
developed here has been that, in the sense in which we ordinarily speak of it, law is necessarily
subordinate to (the dialectic of) authority and to inner law, and, therefore, never possessed of
sovereignty. Of course, ‘sovereignty’ is a slippery enough term that, with a little effort, one
might be able to make it fit human law that is subordinate to authority and inner law. But, as
Stanley Benn concluded in his study of sovereignty, “there would seem to be a strong case for
giving up so Protean a word,”89 and that case, as made out by Jacques Maritain (1882-1973), is
that “the term needed [in constructive political discourse] is not Sovereignty.”90 The word
conjures a legal regime that is a closed system from which no appeal lies. It was Maritain’s
sober judgment that “[t]he two concepts of Sovereignty and Absolutism have been forged
together on the same anvil. They must be scrapped together.”91
The United States of today is no totalitarianism of the sort Maritain was reacting against,
of course. However, a state in which (we are told) God takes care of the natural law and the
judge simply dispatches the democratic majority’s business (except in the limit case in which he
recuses himself), is a state that has smuggled pseudo-sovereignty in through the back door of the
courthouse. What humans do in the name of the law is always only penultimate, never sovereign
or absolute. If, as Vining says, lawyers (like priests) sometimes speak for the sovereign,92 this
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would be because they live in the dialectic of authority, not pretending to sovereignty but seeking
authority in the only place it can be found.
What is created in decision making by participants in the process [of law] can never be
celebrated as individuals’ self-governance -- their own however contingent or arbitrary,
legitimate whatever it is -- for it is not their own lot but others’ that is being fashioned.
Knowledge of this is part of knowledge of law and continuously reconfirmed by practice
in the actual operations of the organized human world. This is the strength of law, this
knowledge. All are trustees, participants and decision makers alike, arguing, deciding,
approving, reacting. All is discussion of value, all is drawn forward by value, all
identification through time with those who are affected in the future and those who have
made decisions in the past is through value. And the central concern of law, atheoretical,
pretheoretical, is then connection of value and responsible mind, for value not connected
by mind to responsible belief is mirage, nothing, vanishing when questioned or sought.
Thus law is at work before any political theory, and after political theory is finished
speaking: nothing is secured by any tracing of power or jurisdiction to a formal source or
process, kingly, judicial, legislative, or popular. Against the constant fading of the
conditions of authority is what comes from law that pushes toward the personal and a
context of decision making in which the personal can be recognized, recognition of the
personal being the only entrance to the experience of authority.93

In law, there is always a decision maker; which is why Vining is right to focus on the
action of the individual’s mind bringing value to bear on a decision of consequence. That
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individual subject acting through office in the name of the law, though he alone is responsible for
satisfying the conditions that give him authority, does so by drawing on the common fund and
dynamic of the community. Although the community needs its authorities, and thus to create
offices, it is the community itself that is jurisgenerative -- not by merely being a democratic
majority, but, as I have argued, by living by the question. The common strain of thought that
looks for law in the dictates of the state to the individual overlooks the true springs of authority
in the community’s common engagement in asking questions, answering them, and then, with
the help of authorities, living by those answers.
Which brings me to the issue I reserved above, viz., how the conditions of ‘living by the
question’ are satisfied once the community has transmitted its authority to authorities. This is a
complex problem, which I can address here only in outline. The preceding analysis has clarified
that there is no authority where its conditions are not satisfied; the problem that attends the
simple failure of those conditions to be satisfied is the different problem of counterfeit
authorities, that is, of authoritarianism. This seems simple enough, except that the satisfaction of
the conditions of authority is not, however, a scalar quantity. Most if not all concrete situations - and decisions guiding conduct are never taken apart from concrete situations -- embody a
messy amalgam of questions answered and questions evaded or suppressed. Lonergan suggests
that sometimes what can be done in the face of such situations will amount to little more than the
withdrawal from the inauthenticity and authoritarianism into which we have slipped. Most of the
time we find ourselves in a world in which what inner law requires of us is not an all or nothing
choice, but rather the choice to work as we can to be authentic ourselves and to encourage its
conditions in the communities and social structures of which we are a contributing members. In
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law, conscientious disobedience and recusal are examples of the more aggressive response that
may be required. Revolution is the limit case.
In those times before revolution and even before recusal and conscientious disobedience,
one problem having to do with authority concerns how to keep the authorities -- that is, the
government officials who constitute ‘the state’ -- meeting the questions of the day for the people
of the day. This is the problem on which most of contemporary constitutional theory of the
‘communitarian’ or ‘civic republican’ sorts has focused, and its focus on ‘dialogue’ as the
legitimating condition of governing has obvious parallels with my conditioning authorities’
authority on their meeting the questions of the day for the people of the day.94 The difficulties of
solving this problem have largely prevented constitutional theorists of the sorts mentioned from
facing that other, related problem of how such government is to create and sustain conditions in
which non-state actors can live by the question, and, doing so, shape the actions taken by their
authorities.
The problem concerns not only the overt mechanisms of ‘self-government;’ it also
reaches its antecedent, that is, culture. By ‘culture’ I mean the set of reasons and values we have
for individual and collective action. Cultures are not given by nature; they have to be created
and re-created (or de-created), and they are to be judged valuable, like social structures,
inasmuch as they encourage us to ask questions and proceed to live by the answers.95 A state
bureaucracy fueled by intelligent asking and answering of questions will be of little value or
relevance to a populace inculturated into passivity, drifting, lethargy, rote rule-following. It has
to be question-and-answer from the bottom to top; anaesthetized subjects are ripe subjects for
authoritarian depredations, not for authority and the law it can generate.
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Because living by inner law means living in community (society) -- no one meets
questions except within a common horizon of experience, understanding, knowledge, values, and
aims -- the state (that is, government) will have as part of its essential work the encouragement of
communities committed to collective learning. The vitality of such communities will depend
more on friendship and love than on the aid of the state, but the state, too, at least much of the
time, will have a positive responsibility to nurture such communities; indeed, the nurturing of
such communities will be one of the reasons that justify the very creation of that part of the
community that we refer to as ‘the state.’ The authority of such communities does not derive
from the state; the authority of any community comes from its collective obedience to inner law,
and the state is that part of the community of persons united in by a set of questions having to do
with the good of the whole body politic that is authorized or empowered to give public effect to
answers.
With respect to authorities acting in the name of ‘the state’ and its law, we should
anticipate a dialectic of authority. When, then, we observe Justice Scalia tilting too far in the
direction of rigidity, closure, and “dogmatic democracy,” we do well recall Professor Glendon’s
reference to “our legal culture.”96 Scalia’s bid for radical reform operates against a background
of intelligentsia who deny -- through a form of judicial imperialism that falls at the other end of
the spectrum from Scalia’s -- that values worth living by emerge through the community’s (or,
rather, communities’) collective inquiry (or inquiries). As we assess Scalia’s attempt to redress
an imbalance caused by judicial legislation in derogation from the central moral tradition of the
West, we observe a case in this point of Vining’s: “Disputes in constitutional or administrative
law,” Vining observes, “are almost always in part about the design of institutions that will make
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law possible,” by making authority possible.97 If we sympathize with Scalia’s attempt to create a
closed universe of legal texts in response to a (legal) culture that would entrust judicial actors
with power that many have grown accustomed to abuse, still we must observe that the
unreasonable responses that unreasonable situations call forth remain, for all that, unreasonable.
“The claim of illegality, persuasively made, is always the claim that what is, even if it has always
been done, has no authority.”98 Except for the appearance of prophet or saint who shocks people
into new ways of aspiring and living, the transitions to be made must be one at a time, meeting
the questions of the day for the people of the day.
I have emphasized the dialectic of authority, but the final word must go to what at the
outset I described as the “rock” on which we can perform the necessary dialectic. That rock on
which we can build is the human subject’s dynamic orientation toward, by way of his primal and
unrestricted desire for, the real and the good. That rock is not a theory or a text, but it provides
the concrete conditions under which the subject begins to move from pure interiority and come
to know the real and the valuable and, then, to instantiate the valuable in his living. A full
account of our interiority lies, of course, beyond the scope of this inquiry into authority in law;
the goal here has been to suggest, in a preliminary way, why nothing else than meeting the
human subject’s eros for the real and the valuable – that is, inner law -- will supply the authority
necessary to law and worthy human living.
Michael Novak once said, in a self-conscious revision of the tradition, that the
unrestricted desire for the real and the valuable is our “natural law.”99 That unrestricted desire
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does not compel us; God does not apply the natural law; our God-given drive for intelligence
about the real and the valuable awaits our response:
We are committed [to the realm of fact and value], not by knowing what it is and that it is
worth while, but by an inability to avoid experience, by the subtle conquest in us of the
Eros that would understand, by the inevitable aftermath of that sweet adventure when a
rationality identical with us demands the absolute, refuses unreserved assent to less than
the unconditioned and, when that is attained, imposes upon us a commitment in which we
bow to an immanent Anagke. . . .
The critical experience can weigh all else in the balance, only on condition that it does
not criticize itself. It is a self-assertive spontaneity that demands sufficient reason for all
else but no justification for its demanding. It arises, fact-like, to generate knowledge of
fact, to push the cognitional process from the conditioned structures of intelligence to
unreserved affirmation of the unconditioned. It occurs.100

The conquest is subtle. History reveals the frequency with which it occurs or fails to
occur, and its further occurrence remains a choice. Such is the dilemma of living, including in
law. The legal analogue of Denzingertheologie does remain a possibility -- but only for those
slouching into authoritarianism.
In conclusion, it remains to be said that it is not because our constitutive eros for the real
and the valuable is (we think) coextensive with the entire world in which we live, and which we
might create, that the last word goes to it; it has the final say because its scope is unrestricted.
Our questions concern the beyond, and what is beyond what we know and do in this world is
what promises to fulfill that unrestricted desire once and for all. The question who “we” are is,
100

Lonergan, Insight, 331–332.

47

as I signaled at the outset, expansive. Denying that the form and direction of our political life
have anything to do with life beyond the here and the now, Justice Scalia would build a wall
between this world and the beyond. What this occludes is the fact that those who follow the
question in the here and now are -- whether they recognize it or not -- on their way to what is
surpassing; they are on the way to recognizing the true and only Sovereign. “The question of
God,” as Lonergan says, “lies within man’s horizon. . . . The contemporary humanist will refuse
to allow the question to arise. But their negations presuppose the spark in our clod, our native
orientation to the divine.”101
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